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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. Prosecutorial Misconduct Violated Mr. Alfaro's Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial 
The prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument includes the following exchange: 
Prosecutor: 
Defense: 
Prosecutor: 
Defense: 
Court: 
[Defense counsel] in the opening told you they weren't contesting 
the shooting and the death of Carlos Chavez. [Defense counsel] 
stood here and told you they weren't contesting the shooting of 
Carlos Chavez. The only issues is Michael the driver. Yet 
[defense counsel] spent the last hour contesting the details of the 
shooting. That's what his closing was doing. 
Judge, for the record, I'll object to the characterization and as to 
the court's rulings previously. 
We just went on an hour-long red herring fishing trip. 
Same objection, Judge. 
You're allowed a continuing objection. 
Tr. Vol. VI p. 822, ln. 17 - p. 824, ln. 6. The prosecutor's argument, particularly characterizing 
defense counsel's entire closing argument as a red-herring fishing trip, went beyond asking the 
jury to return a verdict based on evidence, instructions and permissible inferences. The 
prosecutor's argument instead disparaged defense counsel and ridiculed Mr. Alfaro' s entire 
defense thereby depriving him of his due process right to a fair trial. 
In response, that State argues that the prosecutor's comment was directed at defense 
arguments rather than defense counsel and, thus, was not improper. Respondent's Brief, p. 10. 
Initially, the prosecutor's comments were not directed solely at defense theories. Instead, the 
prosecutor told the jury that defense counsel misled the jury into thinking the defense would not 
contest Carlos' shooting and that defense counsel had instead spent the past hour contesting the 
shooting. In then announcing "we just went on an hour-long red herring fishing trip," the 
prosecutor communicated to the jury that jury that defense counsel spent an hour distracting and 
misleading them. The prosecutor thus disparaged defense counsel as well as the defense 
theories. 
Further, referring to a specific defense argument as a red herring focuses the 
disparagement on the argument itself whereas telling the jury that defense counsel spent the past 
hour misleading the jury disparaged counsel by communicating that counsel personally tried to 
deceive the jury. The State urges that the proper focus under State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 254 
P.3d 77 (Ct. App. 2011) is to "focus on the subject of the disparagement [counsel versus 
counsel's arguments], not the quantity of arguments disparaged." Respondent's Brief, p. 10. 
However, informing the jury that defense counsel took the jury on an hour-long red herring 
fishing trip tells the jury to disregard counsel rather than to disregard specific theories because 
they are not relevant or supported by evidence. For instance, the prosecutor's rebuttal argument 
referred to the oddly placed pool of blood as a "fishing trip." C/Tr. Vol. VI p. 826, ln. 7-8. This 
comment is far less problematic because it occurs in the context of a specific argument and is 
accompanied by an evidence based explanation. Conversely, the complained of exchange 
ridiculed the entire defense and thus encouraged the jury to disregard everything defense counsel 
had said rather to reject one or more defense theories. 
The prosecutor's conduct was particularly unfair because the entirety of defense counsel's 
argument cannot be characterized as peripheral or simply contesting shooting of Carlos. Instead, 
counsel described how there was insufficient evidence to show that the drive-by with Mr. Alfaro 
allegedly at the wheel was the same drive-by that resulted in Carlos' death, that the Eastersider's 
testimony that Mr. Alfaro was the driver was not credible and that the shooting was the result of 
an internal Westsider conflict, not Eastside fire. 
The prosecutor engaged in misconduct by telling the jury that defense counsel was trying 
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to distract the jury. Although Mr. Alfaro objected, the district court did not sustain the objection 
or give the jury a curative instruction. The prosecutor's comment discouraged the jury from duly 
considering the numerous problems with the State's evidence, which were addressed during the 
course of Mr. Alfaro's argument, and this Court cannot say that the impermissible argument did 
not affect the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the prosecutorial misconduct 
deprived Mr. Alfaro of his right to a fair trial and his judgment of conviction must be vacated. 
B. There was Insufficient Evidence to Support the Verdict 
As described by the State, "in the summer of 2004, the violent rivalry between Eastside 
and Westside gangs in Caldwell, Idaho wrought a torrent of drive-by shootings." Respondent's 
Brief, p. 5. Indeed, three such shootings were reported to the police at Harvey's house in the 
month of August alone and there were at least two shootings reported the night Carlos was killed. 
See Tr. Vol. VI p. 412, ln. 1 - p. 413, ln. 12; p. 709, ln. 6-23. It is safe to assume that not every 
drive-by shooting was reported to police. Given this "torrent" of drive-by shootings and the 
inability of the Eastside witnesses to competently identify when Mr. Alfaro allegedly drove a 
vehicle carrying Richard, Evan and Arandu into Westside territory, there wasinsufficient 
evidence to tie that event to the death of Carlos beyond a reasonable doubt. 
None of the Eastsiders competently testified that the night Mr. Alfaro allegedly drove 
around in Westside territory was the same night Carlos was killed. Significantly, Mario's 
testimony and that of an investigating officer establish that he observed Evan and Arandu get into 
a vehicle on an entirely different evening than the night Carlos was shot. A police officer 
testified that he investigated a drive-by shooting that occurred approximately three and one half 
hours before Carlos was shot, which occurred near Mario's and during which a bullet passed by 
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Mario's leg. Tr. Vol. VI p. 657, In. 20 - p. 659, In. 8. Mario testified that this drive-by shooting 
occurred on a different night than the night Mike and Richard picked up Arandu and Evan. Id. at 
p. 260, In. 2 to 261, In. 7. Given the officer's contemporaneous documentation of the date of the 
shooting at Mario's, the inescapable conclusion is that Mario observed Arandu and Evan get into 
a vehicle with Mike and Richard on a night other than the one in which Carlos was shot. 
When Evan met with investigators almost a year after Carlos was shot, he could not 
identify the time of year he had been in the car or the time of day, other than to say it was dark. 
Tr. Vol. VI p. 401, In. 21-25; p. 402, In. 1-4; p. 403, In. 8-11; p. 405, In. 21-25. Although Evan 
testified about an event on "August 14," it is apparent that his testimony concerning the date was 
not based on personal knowledge. Although Richard testified that he and Mike picked up Evan 
and Arandu the evening of August 13, 2004, there was no foundation or basis for his belief that 
the six year old event occurred on that particular date. Both Evan and Richard testified to driving 
by a house in Westside territory with two, not three people standing outside and the time line 
established by Richard, Evan and Mario would have placed the vehicle at Harvey's at 
approximately 1 :00 in the morning, not 3 :30. Other than the conclusory testimony concerning 
the date, no evidence establishes that Richard and Mike picked up Evan and Arandu drove into 
Westsider territory the same night Carlos was killed. 
Nor can the link be derived from the Westsiders' testimony. While Harvey testified that 
the vehicle that shot at his house only drove by one time and did not tum around, Sael testified 
that the vehicle drove by once and then returned. Tr. Vol. VI p. 33, In. 8-21; p. 89, In. 17-25; p. 
92,ln.19-25Id.atp.110,ln. 7-p.111,ln.12;p.124,ln. l-9;p.125,ln.5-23. Harvey 
remembers the lights being turned off whereas Sael did not. Id. Sael said the car was going fast 
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while Harvey said it was going slow. Id. Thus, nothing in the Westsider's testimony could be 
used to link the vehicle involved in the drive-by shooting to the one driven by Mr. Alfaro, such as 
the make or color of the vehicle or even consistent testimony about whether the vehicle turned 
around or had its headlights off. 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, Mr. Alfaro drove a car in which 
passengers shot at a Westsider's residence shortly after midnight sometime during the summer or 
fall of 2004. Had Caldwell not been a gang war zone with multiple drive-by shootings that 
summer, this evidence might have been constitutionally sufficient to prove that Mr. Alfaro drove 
the vehicle to Harvey's residence at 3:30 a.m. on August 14. Constitutionally insufficient 
evidence was presented to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Alfaro participated in the 
drive-by shooting that claimed Carlos' life. Accordingly, his judgment of conviction must be 
vacated. 
C. The District Court Abused its Discretion and Violated Mr. Alfaro's Constitutional 
Rights to a Jury Trial and Due Process by Sentencing Him More Harshly Based on 
His Exercise of His Right to Trial 
The district court sentenced Mr. Alfaro to twenty years to life for driving the vehicle in 
which Richard fired a weapon at Harvey's residence and for which Richard would be sentenced 
to a unified term of fifteen years with a minimum period of confinement of six years. Tr. Vol. VI 
§ 7, p. 30, In. 17-25; p. 56, In. 7-12. The district court opined that Richard's plea bargained 
sentence did not serve justice but that the State was forced into those agreements because Mr. 
Alfaro exercised his right to a jury trial. See Tr. Vol VI, Tab 7, p. 54, In. 22 - p. 55, In. 2. Unable 
to fashion the co-defendants' sentences in a manner that sends an adequate message to "trash" 
such as Mr. Alfaro, the district court took his frustration on Mr. Alfaro and punished him for 
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exercising his right to trial. See id at p. 55, ln. 3-20. This disparate treatment and the district 
court's sentencing was an abuse of discretion and violated Mr. Alfaro's right to a jury trial and 
due process. 
In response, the State notes that a disparity in sentencing among co-defendants in the 
same criminal activity does not make the harsher sentence per se excessive or an abuse of 
discretion and argues that there was no evidence that the district court punished Mr. Alfaro for 
exercising his right to trial. Respondent's Brief, p. 13-14. To the contrary, the district court 
indicated "one of the things that has weighed on this court's mind ever since there's been a 
conviction is how can the court treat Mr. Alfaro any differently than the state agreed to treat Mr. 
Maceda or the state agreed to treat Mr. Alaniz?" Tr. Vol VI, Tab 7, p. 55, ln 3-7. The district 
court then indicated the crime involved deliberate disregard for human life (a factor present with 
all the co-defendants) and expressed the need to communicate that the community cannot allow 
such conduct to continue. This reasoning ties the disparity to general deterrence rather than Mr. 
Alfaro's potential for rehabilitation, which would have been a legitimate reason for treating a 
defendant who puts the State to its proof differently than a defendant who accepts a plea bargain. 
The district court's comments reflect frustration that Mr. Alfaro's co-defendants received too 
little prison time as a result of Mr. Alfaro's exercise of his right to trial and then took that 
:frustration out in sentencing Mr. Alfaro. 
The district court sentenced Mr. Alfaro more harshly than other more culpable parties 
because he exercised his right to trial. This disparate treatment and the district court's sentencing 
was an abuse of discretion and violated Mr. Alfaro's right to a jury trial and due process and his 
sentence should be reversed. 
6 
III. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above and in his opening brief, Mr. Alfaro respectfully asks 
that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and sentences. 
Respectfully submitted this j_!j___ da~3. 
,)-R-ob_yn_F_y_f£..,__e ______ _ 
Attorney for Michael Alfaro 
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